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COMMENT
EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION-AN EVASIVE
SUBSTANTIVE NOTION MASQUERADING
AS PROCEDURE
Recent cases show an increasing judicial concern with the right to
counsel for an indigent accused.' This concern flows from the constitu-
tional requirement of a fair trial for every accused, and has culminated
with Gideon v. Wainright,2 establishing the right to counsel in the
state courts in all cases. Concommitantly, a related concept of effective
representation has acquired momentum. It dates from the language
of Powell v. Alabama.' This latter concept encompasses answers to the
question of what amounts to competent and/or effective counsel. The
answers to the question have proved to be delicate and shifting in
emphasis from concern about "competency of counsel" to a broader
concern about "effective representation."
The concept of "effective representation" is young. However, the
state courts have been examining analogous, representational situations
for some time. Thus, the factors early deemed relevant to considera-
tions regarding "competency of counsel" have played an important
role in the present attempt of courts to circumscribe the question of
what requisite qualities are implicit in the norm of "effective repre-
sentation."
The main thrust of this comment examines the manner in which
the norm of "effective representation" varies with the stage of the pro-
ceedings. Federal and state appellate court opinions will be analyzed
for express statements of decision-influencing factors, and further for
factors not articulated. Finally, the considerations which pour actual
meaning into the legal norm of "effective representation" will be identi-
fied and evaluated in relation to the overriding objective of securing a
constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.
TEE COMPETENCY STANDARD BEFORE PoWELL
Long before Mr. Justice Sutherland initiated the "effective repre-
sentation" concept in Powell, the state courts had been measuring
I For a comprehensive discussion of the most recent developments, see Morris,
Poverty and Criminal Justice, 38 WASH. L. REv. 667 (1963).
2 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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counsel's conduct by a standard of competency.' As an initial proposi-
tion, the courts applied the presumption that a duly licensed lawyer
having met the requirements of law was competent. This presumption,
as well as a number of other constituent factors of "competent repre-
sentation," presented a procedural question in the sense that it had
to be met in every case. Other examples of such a procedural require-
ment were statutory mandates' for competent counsel, and court-made
requirements that all counsel must be at least licensed to practice.
Evidence that a substantive requirement also existed can be seen
when the courts occasionally looked behind the procedural requirement
of appointment to ascertain whether counsel's conduct in fact aided
the accused. Thus, in the early case of State v. Jones,6 the appellate
court, on the basis of the trial record concluded that counsel's conduct
during the trial demonstrated a substantial lack of legal knowledge
which deprived the accused of a fair trial. However, although the
Jones case is an example of gross incompetence compelling the court
to reverse the conviction, other cases' demonstrated a reluctance by
courts to test the quality of representation. Thus, most early allega-
tions of incompetency were confined to incapacity, primarily intoxi-
cation.8 But nonetheless the question was procedural because if coun-
sel's assistance was to be meaningful it required that in every case he
be mentally alert in all respects.
Slowly a shift in emphasis from a procedural requirement to a sub-
stantive requirement began to take place. Thus, an appointment of a
lawyer who represented a co-defendant with conflicting interests was
inadequate.' Of equal inefficacy was the forced appointment of a
lawyer who loudly protested that he was prejudiced toward the de-
fendant.1" An even clearer substantive violation appeared when the
appointed counsel failed to present crucial evidence1 or witnesses.'-
The focus turned from the requirement of what the state should provide
4 The question has been discussed elsewhere. See Comment, 33 WASH. L. REV. 303
(1958); Note 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 400 (1957); Fellman, The Right to Counsel Under
State Law, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 281, 309; Note, 8 ARK. L. REv. 484 (1953); Comment,
47 COLUm. L. REv. 115 (1947).
5 KAN. GEN. STAT. 62-1304 (1953 Supp.) ; but Kansas curiously only requires com-
petent counsel on appeal. See also ME. REv. STAT. ch. 148 § 11 (1954).
6 State v. Jones, 12 Mo. App. 93 (1882).
7 Spears v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. 1950); Blitstein v. State, 218
Wis. 356, 259 N.W. 715 (1935) ; Simmons v. State, 116 Ga. 583, 42 S.E. 779 (1902).
8 State v. Keller, 57 N.D. 645, 223 N.W. 698 (1929).
9 People v. Rose, 348 Ill. 214, 180 N.E. 791 (1932).
10 State v. Jones, 174 La. 1074, 142 So. 693 (1932).
1 People v. Schulman, 299 Ill. 125, 132 N.E. 530 (1921).
12 People v. O'Brien, 110 App. Div. 26, 96 N.Y. Supp. 1045 (1905).
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the accused in every case to attention of what part counsel had played
in assisting accused in the particular case.
A similar development took place in the federal courts. Hagan v.
United States3 is representative. Since the trial judge had considerable
experience and counsel for the co-defendant failed to notice any mental
deficiency in the appointed attorney, the court held there had been a
substantial defense presented. While there was no finding of incompe-
tency, the case does typify the shift in emphasis from a procedural
requirement to a substantive requirement. The procedural requirement
alone would have been met merely by counsel's presence, but satis-
faction of the substantive requirement compelled the court to look
beyond counsel's mere presence and scrutinize his conduct in the
discharge of his duty.
With the decision in Powell v. Alabama" the previous shift in em-
phasis from a procedural requirement to a substantive requirement was
fully unveiled. Mr. Justice Sutherland cast the die by using the term
"effective representation." The mere literal use of this term forces a
reviewing court to do more than see that accused is represented.
Instead, an appellate court following this literal command must look
to see what in fact counsel has done or failed to do in his duty to aid
the accused-a substantive question of due process.
The quality of the representation in Powell was found defective in
two ways: First, the appointment was too general in that the entire
local bar was appointed as defense counsel. Thus, the onus of respon-
sibility was upon no one in particular. Second, the appointment was
too close to the time of the trial, thus denying counsel the opportunity
with which to prepare adequately. This action by the Court, in going
behind the mere formal appointment makes it hard to fit Powell's
holding into the traditional procedural rules. In the sense that it is
closely related to the fair trial concept of a proper notice and hearing,
the Powell requirement of "effective representation" is a procedural
requirement; but it is substantive in the sense that it looks beyond
the state's duty to provide adequate legal mechanisms for notice and
hearing and instead, with certain limitations, concentrates on counsel's
conduct and the factors that affect his conduct of the defense. The
latter view of due process has prevailed in the federal system. For
example, not only must counsel have been appointed in sufficient time
to prepare, 5 but he must, in fact, by his trial appearance demonstrate
139 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1925). 24287 U.S. 45 (1932).
15 Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851, 855 (4th Cir. 1962).
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that he has performed the tasks of reasonable preparation. " Surely,
this latter is a substantive notion. Further, counsel cannot effectively
proceed with accused's defense if the prosecuting witness is a past,
and possibly a prospective, business client or if other conflicting
interests such as a contrary defense of a co-defendant exists.' Neither
can the court appoint counsel with conflicting interests in the form of
desired employment with the prosecuting district attorney against
whom they seek to defend accused's case, 9 particularly when this
conflict is combined with appointed counsel's inexperience."0 As the
federal courts have formulated the concept, not only is investigation
important prior to trial, but, in addition, the effects of such a proper
investigation on the trial are considered of particularly great signifi-
cance in that it allows counsel to function with an informed judgment."'
Notwithstanding the past substantive application of both "effective
representation" and its historical predecessor "competent representa-
tion," a recent case, Mitchell v. United States," characterized "effective
representation" as a procedural due process concept. An examination
of the problem which the court faced in that case, will aid in explaining
the court's result, but not its reasoning. The allegations of "ineffective
representation" in Mitchell were counsel's failure to move for acquittal,
failure to cross examine, failure to object to hearsay evidence, and
failure to object to jury instructions. Each allegation involves a ques-
tion of counsel's professional judgment. As the court pointed out, as
yet, no aptitude test or other means to measure skill is available. Up to
this point the court is correct and the observation by the court gives us
a clue to the result. Even lacking a standard to measure professional
judgment, a substantive requirement still remains that counsel exercise
judgment during the course of the trial and this requirement can be
tested by ascertaining whether counsel exercised an informed judg-
ment. Thus, the court's inquiry should have focused on what counsel
did in preparation. However, the court's choice of dismissing the
allegations on the basis that "effective representation" is a procedural
16 Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962) cert. denied 372 U.S. 978
(1963). Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1962).
17 Tucker v. United States, 235 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1956). But see United States v.
Pugh, 106 F. Supp. 209 (D. Guam 1952).
18 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) ; Kyle v. United States 263 F.2d
657 (9th Cir. 1959).
19 MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1961).
20 Ibid.
21 Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962) cert. denied 372 U.S. 978
(1963).
22 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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requirement, demonstrates how easily and improperly substantive re-
quirements can be distinguished into nonexistence by the use of legal
abstractions.
Once it is accepted that "effective representation" is and should be
a substantive due process consideration, a further examination is
necessary of what the contents of the concept are and how they vary
with the stage of the proceedings. Also, the factors that affect the
substance of the concept need identification. This investigation follows.
THE STAGES OF THE DEFENSE CouNsEL's RESPONSIBILITY
While the same abstract standard-effective representation--can be
applied to the entire proceeding, its content varies with the stage in
question. For example, an omission in pre-trial investigation which
overlooks a substantial defense will pervade all subsequent proceed-
ings, whereas a failure to object to incompetent evidence during the
trial, viewed in the entire trial context, may be of little significance. A
chronological consideration of the stages will serve to demonstrate the
varying demands.
Before the Trial-Preparation. At this initial stage, two demands
are particularly important: First, counsel must consult and advise ac-
cused of his rights and the alternatives open to accused.23 Second, from
this consultation counsel should elicit sufficient information to begin
preparation of the defense.2 As one court has stated, "No legal repre-
sentation is worthy of the name if the lawyer makes no investigation
of the background of the client's plea.... 2  Thus, obviously the
actual preparation undertaken is the key to effectiveness. This prep-
aration should include a reasonably thorough factual investigation"
which encompasses interviewing and procuring witnesses," ascertaining
the accused's mental capacity, if it is open to question," and, in general,
ascertaining and establishing each substantial defense of the accused."
However, even though counsel has a duty to prepare, the level of
23 McKenzie v. State, 233 Miss. 216, 101 So.2d 651 (1958). But see United States
v. Haug, 21 F.R.D. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1957). See also Penn v. Smyth, 188 Va. 367,
49 S.E.2d 600 (1948) where lack of consultation was held insufficient of itself to show
ineffective representation.
24Brubacker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962) cert. denied 372 U.S. 978
(1963). Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F2d 851 (4th Cir. 1962).
25 Id. at 855.
20 Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F2d 30, 38, 39 (9th Cir. 1962) cert. denied 372 U.S.
978 (1963). Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1962).
27 Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
28 Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 35, 38 (9th Cir. 1962) cert. denied 372 U.S.
978 (1963).2) Id. at 38.
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effectiveness is not measured by the amount of time consumed in oral
discussion and research.80
The duty to interview witnesses means not only the defendant's
witnesses, but the adverse witnesses as well, and should these witnesses
give equivocal statements as to recollection, then concurrent with his
interview duty, counsel has the right to secure prior statements by the
witnesses previously given to the state." If counsel does not have suffi-
cient time to adequately investigate, secure witnesses, and prepare the
defense, because he was appointed an unreasonably short time before
trial, then he should move for a continuance. The court will commit
reversible error if it refuses such a motion unless it is shown that the
defendant has been remiss in the protection of his own rights by
failing to secure counsel or, perhaps by failing to request appointed
counsel. 2 However, the granting of a continuance is within the trial
judge's discretion and is not easily overturned.3 After the investigation
has acquainted counsel with the details of the case, he should further
consult with the accused and advise him of the alternatives 3 -- whether
to plead guilty or go to trial. Thus, the accused, if he can appreciate
his situation, can make an informed choice on the basis of counsel's
advice. 5 If the accused is incapable of making such a decision, then
counsel would decide for him."0
At the Trial. At this stage counsel is required to make on-the-spot
decisions. These decisions of necessity involve an exercise of judgment.
As long as this exercise of judgment is done on the basis of sufficient
information as a consequence of proper preparation, counsel's decision
should not be open to the speculation and surmise of second-guessing
by the appellate court. Formulating a standard of professional judg-
ment is impossible, 7 and without such a standard the question of trial
tactics is a question of individual choice easily second guessed after an
adverse result. Only an outer limit, i.e., repeated gross misjudgment,
could readily establish ineffectiveness. However, the need for an exer-
cise of informed judgment cannot be overemphasized. Thus counsel
30 United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2nd Cir. 1949).
31 Vetter v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 132, 10 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1963).
32 Perkins v. Commonwealth, 305 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1957).
33 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Grifiths v. United States, 172
F.Supp. 691 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
34 The court in Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 35 (9th Cir. 1962), n. 18 makes
this implicit in its holding.
35 Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836, 845 (1959).
36 Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
37 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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cannot do an incomplete job of pre-trial preparation, omit substantial
defenses and expect effectively to represent accused at the trial.3"
Nevertheless, certain failures at the trial have resulted in an in-
effectiveness finding. Failure to object when the trial judge criticized
the accused and failure to object to other incompetent evidence both
lead to a similar conclusion."9 Equally as defective is the failure to
take any exceptions and the neglect to make essential routine motions."0
And certainly counsel who criticizes his own client in front of the jury
is not representing his client properly.4' Counsel's failure to present
crucial witnesses or evidence, 2 or ineptness to such an extent that the
evidence could not be introduced, even with the trial judge's assist-
ance,43 lead to similar conclusions. However, counsel's failure to make
possible appropriate motions does not compel a finding that he repre-
sented ineffectively." Should an accused, after appropriate advice,
plead guilty, then counsel has the further duty to consult with the
accused before sentencing on the guilty plea. 5 Particularly is this
required if the state has a separate procedure and hearing for
sentencing. 4
After the Trial. Counsel's duties do not end with a verdict or a
38 Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
30 Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E2d 848 (1943).40 Lloyd v. State, 15 Okla. Crim. 130, 175 Pac. 374 (1918) ; State v. Bouse, 199 Ore.
676, 264 P2d 800 (1953).41 Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E2d 848 (1943) ; Kidder v. People, 115 Colo.
72, 169 P.2d 181 (1946).12 Jones v. Huff, 152 F2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Johnson v. United States, 110 F.2d
562 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; People v. Schulman, 299 Ill. 125, 132 N.E. 530 (1921) ; People
v. O'Brien, 110 App. Div. 26, 96 N.Y. Supp. 1045 (1905).
13 People v. Schulman, supra note 42.
"4 Failure to move for change of venue or continuance, United States ex rel Darcy
v. Handy, 203 F2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1952) ; Sweet v. Howard, 155 F2d 715 (7th Cir.
1946) ; Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ga. 1942). Failure to move for
trial judge's disqualification on the ground that the judge had sufficient knowledge
pertaining to the defense which would have enabled him to form an opinion, State v.
Bentley, 46 N.J. Super. 193, 134 A.2d 445 (1957). Failure to attack a defective indict-
ment, McConnaughy v. Alvis, 100 Ohio App. 245, 136 N.E2d 127, aff'd 165 Ohio St.
102, 133 N.E.2d 133 (1956). Failure to move to suppress evidence, United States v.
Springfield, 178 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Cal. 1959). Waiver of arraignment, Fluty v.
State, 224 Ind. 652, 71 N.E.2d 565 (1947). But see Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F2d 108(7th Cir. 1957) where failure to request instructions or object to instructions proffered
was part of the ground for ineffective representation.
45 Brubacker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962). Compare State ex rel. Denning
v. Riggs, 251 Minn. 120, 86 N.W.2d 723 (1955) where there was duty to further give
accused advice even though the guilty plea was not well advised.
46 For an example of how one court handled this problem see Brubaker v. Dickson,
310 F2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962). An interesting note at this point is the non-existence
of a separate sentencing procedure in Washington and its possible effect of compelling
counsel to present the proper witness for mitigation, etc., during the course of the
trial to assist the court in the determination of a proper sentence.
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plea of guilty. He must still advise accused of his appeal possibilities
and perform whatever further advocate functions are required. As
mentioned above, if the jurisdiction has a separate sentencing pro-
cedure, counsel will be expected to be present48 and to present matters
in mitigation. Should the circumstances justify it, he may be expected
to move for a new trial." Securing the appeal will be an additional
duty counsel will be expected to fulfill."
Thus at each stage of the defense proceedings, effective representa-
tion attaches a responsibility to counsel which varies with the stage
in question. As the discussion below will indicate, this variant duty
has major significance when attempting to determine what standard
must be applied to ascertain whether effective representation has in
fact been given.
DECISION INFLUENCING FACTORS
To ascertain what the appropriate standards should be, the factors
affecting the decisions must be extracted either from the express lan-
guage of the opinions, or the context of the social situation. Some
factors are important only at one stage of the defense; others, such
as counsel's conflict of interests, cut across the entire proceedings.
Sufficient time to prepare the defense is of prime importance. This
includes time to investigate the facts,51 and further, once the facts have
been determined and critical witnesses ascertained, the appointment
must have been made with sufficient time to allow counsel to locate the
witnesses." Since the jury plays a critical role in a fair trial, there
must be sufficient time to allow counsel to investigate the jury panel."
An opportunity to interview the witnesses, even though incarcerated,
must be given counsel,54 particularly since this is his duty." If the facts
are of record from a prior trial, counsel's burden may be lessened, 6
47 Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962); Brubaker v. Dickson, 310
F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962). But compare Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1948).
48 See note 46 su pra.
49 People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615, 110 N.E.2d 249 (1953).
50 See Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1962).
51 Lloyd v. State, 241 Ind. 192, 170 N.E.2d 904 (1960) ; People v. Avilez, 86 Cal.
App.2d 289, 194 P.2d 829 (1948) ; State v. Howard, 238 La. 595, 116 So.2d 43 (1959).
The latter case sustained the conviction but recognized that the time required varies
with the individual situation.
52 Wright v. Johnston, 77 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
-3 State v. Speller, 230 N.C. 345, 53 S.E.2d 294 (1949).
54 Wilson v. State, 93 Ga. App. 229, 91 S.E.2d 201, 202 (1956).
55 Vetter v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App.2d 132, 10 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1963).
56 Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
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but this does not excuse failure to allow counsel sufficient time to
prepare. 57
A final reflection on the time factor would lead to the conclusion
that in any of the above instances the requisite amount of time will
vary with: 1) the charge against the accused, 2) counsel's knowledge
of the law involved, and 3) the relative complexity of the facts.58 Then
should additional time be needed, counsel should request a continuance
and it must be denied before the effective representation question arises.
Ineffective representation can occur when conflicts of interest
between counsel and accused's defense arise. For example, an attorney
seeking employment with the district attorney, who is the adversary
in accused's case, will be a sufficient circumstance to cause the court
to question whether accused was defended with the requisite zeal. 9
Even as late in the proceedings as sentencing, the accused can be
denied effective representation if counsel represents co-defendants,
one of whom was convicted of a lesser charge and would suffer a lighter
penalty. 0 A conflict in co-defendant's defenses, unforeseen prior to
trial, will be sufficient to affect the effectiveness of the representation. 1
A conflict which is particularly gregarious occurs when counsel has
represented the prosecuting witness in a prior civil action and is hopeful
that he may represent him again.62 The consequence to accused is the
lack of the required zealous defense. When the defense counsel acts
at the prosecuting attorney's request without knowledge of the facts
and for the purpose of waiving the preliminary hearing, the expectable
result is ineffective representation. 3 An even more obvious conflict of
interests is the appointment of the prosecuting attorney to get the
accused a suspended sentence.6 However, a disagreement between the
accused and his appointed counsel is not the sort of conflict of interest
which necessarily will void the representation." Also, there is ineffec-
tive representation when the appointed lawyer presided as judge pro
tempore at the arraignment. The attempt to function in both roles,
57 See cases cited supra note 51.
58 United States v. Wight, 176 F2d 376 (2nd Cir. 1949).
50 MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960).
60 Kyle v. United States, 263 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1959).
61 Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954).
62 Tucker v. United States, 235 F2d 238 (9th Cir. 1950). But cf. United States v.
Pugh, 106 F. Supp. 209 (D. Guam 1952), rev'd on, other grounds 212 F.2d 761 (9th Cir.
1954).
63 People v. Chesser, 29 Cal.2d 815, 178 P.2d 761 (1947).
64 Hernandez v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 4, 133 S.W.2d 585 (1939).
35 State ex rel. Sweet v. Hancock, 224 Ind. 225, 66 N.E2d 131 (1948). The court
felt that providing a public defender system was the extent of the assistance the state
could give and accused had the hard choice of counsel he disliked or no representation.
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although at different times, affects counsel's ability to aid effectively.66
Similarly, an appointment in the face of a statement of counsel showing
a strong prejudice against the defendant is also defective.6" The latter
situation coupled with a counsel who criticizes his own client before
the jury demonstrates clearest evidence of inadequate assistance.68
Lack of interest or a repressed interest of counsel also may be generated
by fear of mob compulsion."
Should counsel be appointed with sufficient time to prepare and
without any patent conflicts of interest, effective representation will be
tested by counsel's performance of the expected functions. Logically,
it would seem that if counsel is to perform effectively, then his first
duty in preparing the defense is to consult with the accused. 0 There
is a right to such consultation,7" and that right is one of confidential
consultation. 2 The minimum requirement is that counsel inform ac-
cused of his rights."3 A single consultation may be sufficient, but this
depends upon what the accused and counsel determine as sufficient. "
Consultation during recess has been held adequate to satisfy the re-
quirement, 7  but this seems a questionable holding if in fact accused
was not fully apprised of his rights and counsel was not fully aware of
the major defensive possibilities, particularly since counsel in question
was the third attorney in succession who had been appointed to repre-
sent accused. A total failure by appointed counsel to consult with
accused was held not to be a denial of effective representation."6
Perhaps this latter holding can be explained on the basis of the pre-
sumptions of regularity of the proceedings 7  and of competence of
counsel that courts constantly use in this area."8 The existence of these
presumptions and blind misapplication of them due to failure to
examine the individual situation often lead to questionable results.
Before some courts will entertain a plea that counsel did not have
66 Tokash v. State, 232 Ind. 668, 115 N.E.2d 745 (1953). Contra, State v. Burrel,
120 N.J.L. 277, 199 At. 18 (1938).
67 State v. Jones, 174 La. 1074, 142 So. 693 (1932).
68 Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1943).
69 Roper v. Territory, 7 N.M. 255, 33 Pac. 1014 (1893) ; State v. Weldon, 91 S.C
29, 74 S.E. 43 (1911).
70 McKenzie v. State, 233 Miss. 216, 101 So.2d 651 (1958).
71 Stagemeyer v. State, 133 Neb. 9, 273 N.W. 824 (1937).
72 State v. Cory, 62 Wn.2d 371, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963).
73 Abraham v. State, 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950).
74 Fluty v. State, 224 Ind. 652, 71 N.E.2d 565 (1947).
,5 Slaughter v. United States, 89 A.2d 646 (D.C. Mun. App. 1952).
76 Penn v. Smyth, 188 Va. 367, 49 S.E.2d 600 (1948).
77 Beckett v. Hudspeth, 131 F.2d 195 (10th Cir. 1942).
78 United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1949).
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enough time to consult with accused, there must be a showing that the
defect was brought to the attention of the trial judge and the time must
have been so short that it is likely that the accused did not get aid or
advice.79 Alternatively, it is sometimes stated that the prosecutor has
the duty to halt the proceedings for gross ineptness? ° Such holdings
are sound only if the facts do not disclose the accused's lack of mental
capability or lack of appreciation for his difficulty. Should these de-
ficiencies exist, accused would not be able tQ call the defect to the trial
judge's attention."1 In this latter respect a recent New York decision 2
presents some difficulty. The court said that if the essential assistance
of counsel could have been given accused, despite the short consultation
period, then it may not be said that the court denied accused adequate
representation of counsel, even though in fact accused may not have
been adequately or properly represented. In light of recent cases"
holding that the court will not subject the question of satisfaction of
accused's rights to surmise or speculation, the New York court's ap-
proach is vulnerable.
Counsel's misconduct will be a determinative factor in deciding
whether effective representation has been given. Tampering with the
evidence will produce a negative result when counsel is forced to admit
that he has done so before the jury."' The same result can be expected
when an attorney is adjudged in contempt and prevented from assisting
accused. 5 However, advice by counsel attempting to induce accused
to swear to a fabricated defense will not work in accused's favor;"
nor will remarks by counsel disparaging the court, lead to a holding
of ineffective representation." However, misconduct, manifested by
counsel's abandoning the defendant during the trial and before the
jury, will lead to a result in accused's favor.88
Various types of disabilities of counsel will force an ineffective repre-
sentation conclusion. Intoxicated counsel will be found ineffective,
8 9
but in some instances, due to application of a more stringent standard,
the court will not find ineffectiveness if the lack of sobriety did not
7 Powell v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 356 (M.D. Ala. 1957).80 Melanson v. O'Brien, 191 F2d 963, 968 (1st Cir. 1951).
81 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 477 (1945).
82 People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 356, 165 N.E.2d 551 (1960).
83 MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1961).
84 Grandsinger v. Bovey, 153 F. Supp. 201 (D. Neb. 1957).85 Meeks v. United States, 163 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1947).86 Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 743, 79 S.W.2d 204 (1935).
87 People v. MacDonald, 365 Ill. 233, 6 N.E.2d 182 (1936).88 Garner v. State, 97 Ark. 63, 132 S.W. 1010 (1910).
89 State v. Keller, 57 N.D. 645, 223 N.W. 698 (19293
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convince the trial court that accused was not getting a fair trial.9" A
form of misconduct can be evidenced by a lack of good faith assist-
ance.9 However, this begins to overlap with the conflict of interest
factor, as a case where the attorney was a friend of accused's purported
victim would demonstrate. Also counsel may not be able to perform
properly because he suffers from mental or physical disability. For
example, where counsel was deaf, old, and unable to follow the pro-
ceedings, the court held these facts to be of sufficient significance to
justify reversal.93 However, where counsel was committed to an insti-
tution for the mentally deranged shortly after the trial, the court felt
the fact that neither counsel for co-defendant nor the trial judge sus-
pected the deficiency vitiated the imputation of incompetency.9" This
rationale is at least questionable. The focus of the court's attention
should have been upon whether or not the defect affected the total
presentation of the defense, not just the performance in the area. In
the area of counsel's disability there appears to be a feeling generated
by appellate courts that it is the function of the trial court to protect
the accused's interests, and that when an insane or intoxicated attorney
is before the court's scrutiny it is inconceivable that an insane or intoxi-
cated attorney would be able to prejudice his client. Thus, if a case is
prosecuted to finality, there is the customary presumption that the pro-
ceedings were regular95 which is difficult to overcome, even if later it
appears that the disability is shown to have existed during the trial. In
instances of affirmative misconduct, this view and the operation of the
presumption may be realistic, but its absolute application rules out the
possibility of ascertaining whether or not there have been prejudicial
omitted defenses.
Counsel's ill health may be another determinative factor in finding
ineffectiveness.9" However, the question again is one within the trial
judge's discretion, 7 and a finding of abuse of discretion is a difficult
matter. If the question is one of physical exhaustion, considerations
90 Some courts leave this to the trial judge's discretion, People v. Harrison, 46
Cal. App.2d 779, 117 P.2d 19 (1941). But a federal court states, at least in the case
of employed counsel, that the defendant who trusts himself to care of such an individual
must bear the consequences, Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941).
91 United States ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, 52 F. Supp. 265 (N.D. Ill. 1943).
92 State v. Jones, 174 La. 1074, 142 So. 693 (1932).
93 People v. Butterfield, 37 Cal. App.2d 140, 99 P.2d 310 (1940).
94 Hagan v. United States, 9 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1925).
95 Beckett v. Hudspeth, 131 F.2d 195 (10th Cir. 1942).
96 Woolsey v. People, 98 Colo. 62, 53 P.2d 596 (1936) ; Jones v. State, 147 Fla. 677,
3 So.2d 388 (1941).
97 Jones v. State, supra note 96. See also State v. Mastricovo, 221 La. 312, 59 So.2d
403 (1952).
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similar to those discussed above apply."8 Also, intoxication is not only
a question of misconduct, but also a capacity defect.
Legal incapacity in various forms can prevent adequate representa-
tion. Appointment of someone not authorized to practice law is de-
fective representation. 0 So if the attorney is a non-resident, or is not
admitted to the local bar and he then attempts to conduct the defense
without sufficient knowledge of local law, the finding will be ineffective
representation.100 Where the attorney appointed to represent accused
had been removed from the roll of the state bar for nonpayment of
dues, and thus was not authorized to practice law under the rules of
the supreme court of that state, it was held that accused was deprived
of his right to have the trial court appoint qualified counsel.' How-
ever, conduct of the defense by a disbarred attorney was held to be
adequate where no prejudice was shown."0 2 This decision is question-
able because facts of prejudice, resulting from an attorney's disbar-
ment, will more than likely not appear in the record, but particularly in
a small community, have a disastrous prejudicial effect on a reputation
basis. A court adhering to "record-worship"'0 3 will not be able to take
these extra record factors of prejudice into consideration.
Inexperience of counsel has long been a basis for alleging incom-
petency,' and more recently ineffective representation. The first
obstacle for an accused to overcome is the presumption of competency
that exists by having been admitted to practice. 05 The inexperience
allegation alone will not be sufficient to overcome this presumption.'
However, complete inexperience in criminal cases resulting in consis-
tent serious blunders or leaving appointed counsel no match for the
prosecuting attorneys has been a ground for reversal of the convic-
tion.' By itself, inexperience should not be decisive, but combined
98 Tiller v. State, 110 Ga. 250, 34 S.E. 204 (1899) ; Hayne v. State, 99 Ga. 212, 25
S.E. 307 (1896).
99 Jones v. State, 57 Ga. App. 344, 195 S.E. 316 (1938); Baker v. State, 9 Okla.
Crim. 62, 130 Pac. 820 (1912).
100 People v. Cox, 12 Ill.2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).01 Martinez v. State, 318 S.W2d 66 (Tex. Crim. 1958). Cf. McKcinzie v. Ellis, 185
F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
102 State v. Johnson, 64 S.D. 162, 265 N.W. 599 (1936).
103 See Comment, 47 CoLum. L. Rav. 115, 120-22 (1947).
104 State v. Jones, 12 Mo. App. 93 (1882). See also People v. Ives, 17 Cal.2d 459,
110 P.2d 408 (1941). Louisiana requires that for defense of capital cases, counsel
with five years experience must be appointed, LA. REv. STAT. fit. 15, § 143 (1950).
105 State v. Bird, 31 Wn.2d 777, 198 P2d 978 (1948).
100 Simmons v. State, 116 Ga. 583, 42 S.E. 779 (1902).
107 People v. Winchester, 352 Ill. 237, 185 N.E. 580 (1933) (criminal inexperience
on hearsay evidence); State v. Bouse, 199 Ore. 676, 264 P.2d 800 (1953) (same on
allowing prejudicial evidence). Wheatley v. United States, 198 F.2d 325 (10th Cir.
1952).
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with omissions, and other errors,"' it acquires greater weight. However,
policy considerations weigh heavily in the court's refusal to condemn
counsel on the basis of inexperience, because this would discourage
younger members of the bar-the source of the bulk of indigent ac-
cused representation-from accepting the appointments.
The state's interest is a factor influencing the decisions. Thus, it has
been held that accused is not entitled to relief even though he had no
effective assistance of counsel, unless the state, through the court,
prosecutor, or other law enforcement officer, denied or interfered with
the accused's right to effective aid.' Similarly, another court has said
that the fact that counsel's incompetence exists does not establish that
the state deprived the accused of any constitutional right. This is a
misplaced "state-action" concept. Thus, the courts by placing emphasis
on this improper factor conclude that accused had not been ineffectively
represented. The Washington court has seemingly been influenced by
analogous factors. For example, when accused has a strong case
against him, the court felt that it would have been of no avail to remand
the case even for gross blunders of counsel, because from the trial
court's record the result would have to be the same.10 Even the fact
that assigned counsel was negligent or otherwise at fault in performing
his assigned duty did not warrant reversal of a conviction where the
state did not fail to perform any duty it owed to accused."' Such an
approach is unrealistic in failing to account for the accused's need for
a fair trial. Modern constitutional interpretations lead to the con-
clusion that counsel's performance of a thorough, effective job is the
most critical facet of the trial. Thus, to shift the emphasis from an
affirmative duty on defense counsel and substitute for it a burden on
the court, or the prosecutor, is to dilute the heart of our adversary
system.
1 2
108 Sanchez v. State, 199 Ind. 235, 157 N.E. 1 (1927), where counsel had a lack of
knowledge of the law in that he was unaware of subpoena power. Lloyd v. State, 15
Okla. Crim. 130, 175 Pac. 374 (1918), where counsel failed to preserve a record or
present the issue of a lesser offense.
109 People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 165 N.E.2d 551 (1960).110 Farrell v. Lanagan, 166 F.2d 845 (1st Cir. 1948). See also State v. Griffiths,
52 Wn.2d 721, 328 P.2d 897 (1958), where a similar attitude prevails because of the
court's view of the strong case against the accused. See also People v. Odium, 91
Cal. App.2d 761, 205 P.2d 1106 (1949), where counsel represented to the defendant
that a state officer had made a commitment which if actually made would vitiate the
plea, and if the acts of the state officer were innocently made would corroborate the
representation of counsel and the defendant has relied upon them and thus been pre-
vented from execising his free will and judgment, the state in its solicitude cannot
accept the benefit of the plea.
11 People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 165 N.E2d 551 (1960).
112 Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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DECISIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRiAL-QuESTIONS
OF JUDGMENT
A standard for counsel's exercise of judgment is difficult if not im-
possible to ascertain. Thus most informed exercise of judgment is
characterized as "trial tactics" and only repeated gross misjudgment
is condemned. As one court has-stated: "There are no tests by which
it can be determined how many errors an attorney may make before
his batting average becomes so low as to make his representation
ineffective."'1 Another court's view is that the law does not require
perfection in representation by counsel but only that such represen-
tation be with reasonable skill and diligence.11" ' However, even against
such a standard, misapprehension of substantive law can be the basis
for an ineffective representation finding."5
Of course, when the error in judgment is repeated and gross, the
holding must be incompetency or ineffectiveness." 6 At such a point
the court would have a duty to intervene."' Even a court that refuses
to find ineffective representation unless the proceedings degenerate to
the stage where the court should intervene is not inflexible. Thus,
where counsel by conscience was prevented from defending accused in
accordance with the customary standards of an attorney, the situation
formed the basis for ineffective representation even though the court
and prosecutor failed to intervene." 8
Determinations of what witnesses to call are questions of judgment
for the attorney,"' but in a particular situation failure to call witnesses
who will establish a substantial defense will lend weight to the final
determination of ineffective representation." However, when counsel
failed to object to a leading question, the court attempted to surmise
what counsel's motivation was, imputing to him tactical genius."' By
the same token, courts have deemed failure to suppress evidence,"'
failure to object to admission of a coerced confession,"' failure to
present proof of good moral character,"" and failure to prove bad
"i Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
14 Bays v. State, 240 Ind. 37, 159 N.E2d 393 (1959).
115 United States ex rel. Hall v. Ragan, 60 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1945).
116 State v. Bouse, 199 Ore. 676, 264 P2d 800 (1953).
117 Ibid. But it may be reversible error for the judge to intervene, United States
ex reL. Darcy v. Handy, 97 F. Supp. 930 (M.D. Pa. 1951).118 Johns v. Smyth, 176 F.Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
11 Lewis v. Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
120 Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
"1 Harris v. United States, 239 F2d 612 (5th Cir. 1957).
122 United States v. Springfield, 178 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
123 People v. Boyce, 314 Mich. 608, 23 N.W.2d 99 (1946).
24 Fluty v. State, 224 Ind. 652, 71 N.E2d 565 (1947).
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character of the victim,"' as questions of trial strategy for counsel's
judgment, and not the basis for finding ineffective representation.
Failure to put the accused on the stand is a question of balancing ad-
vantages and disadvantages which counsel in exercise of judgment
must perform,' but leaving this decision to the accused may be a
failure to perform counsel's advisory function." '
Failure to utilize defenses would be thought to present the question
of effectiveness, but courts have generally held that such a matter is
again a question of exercise of discretion.' 8 Failure to require an alibi
charge is not ineffective representation."2 9 Failure to utilize a defense
of insanity is similarly a question of advice and judgment and not a
basis for error.' However, a holding that refusal to present a defense
shifts the responsibility to the accused to disclose the defense would
seem to defeat the entire purpose of requiring assistance of counsel. 3'
Nevertheless, such a requirement has been espoused,"' and the same
court stated further that if counsel would not present the defense,
accused must then appeal to the court to assign him counsel who would.
Not only does this defeat the purpose of requiring counsel, but other
defects in this approach are readily apparent. Accused would be
typically unfamiliar with the legal subculture's language and may not
have a complete knowledge of the types of defenses his facts may
present,' and thus not only be incapable of disclosing this to his
attorney, but incapable of objecting to the trial court when counsel
refuses or neglects to present such defenses. The task of translating
the facts of the accused's problem into the language of the legal sub-
culture is for counsel.3 4 It is unrealistic to expect the accused, par-
ticularly should he be suffering from a mental defect or low mentality,
to disclose his "true defense"'3 5 to the attorney. The underlying, in-
articulated reason sustaining the conviction may be that the court
fears accused has a defense, but purposely fails to disclose it, in hope
125 EX parte Lovelady, 207 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Crim. 1948).
126 State v. English, 85 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 1957) ; Jones v. State, 224 Ark. 134,
273 S.W.2d 534 (1954).
127 Compare Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959) with Abraham
v. State, 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950).
128 Commonwealth ex rel. Carey v. Prison Keeper 370 Pa. 604, 88 A.2d 904 (1952).
129 Bays v. State, 240 Ind. 37, 159 N.E.2d 393 (1959).
130 People v. Heirens, 4 Ill.2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954). But see Brubaker v.
Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
131 State v. Arrellano, 68 Nev. 134, 227 P.2d 963 (1951).
132 Ibid. See also People v. Garrow, 130 Cal. App.2d 75, 278 P.2d 475 (1955).
133 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 477 (1945).
's4 Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
.35 See, e.g., Sayre v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 338, 238 S.W. 737, 739 (1922).
[VOL. 39
EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
of getting a second trial.186 Again, the court should not hypothesize
that such is the case, but examine the facts and ascertain whether in
the given instance the accused has actually attempted concealment. 8 '
Failure to present arguments to the jury is another matter for counsel's
judgment, falling within the category of trial tactics. However, when
counsel refuses to argue to the jury because of his own pre-judgment
of the accused's guilt, the conclusion is ineffective representation. 8
Where the accused has employed his own counsel rather than having
court appointed counsel, some courts have felt the basis for a distinction
exists."' The distinction is created by use of an agency concept. By
the agency rule the acts of the attorney are imputed to the client, and
the client is bound by them."" This may even be the result when
counsel is appointed by the court. 4 ' As a consequence the accused
must raise objection to his counsel's conduct while the trial is pro-
gressing rather than wait until the trial is over and then attempt to
assert the misconduct as a defense. 42 The reason behind this judicial
attitude is a concern that the accused and counsel may collude in an
effort to get the court to grant a new trial on the ground of this planned
but concealed misconduct.' Collusion may be a real possibility, but
nevertheless, if the courts presume that counsel is competent then it
would not seem too far afield for them to presume high professional
ethics.'44 Also, a blind application of the agency principle is unrealistic.
The courts are taking a facet of commercial law and, as an expedient,
applying it to criminal law. The analogy is not sound, because the
agency relationship assumes that the principle has control of the situa-
tion, and guides the agent. However, in the criminal law case, the
contrary is of necessity the case; if it were not, then there would be no
need for counsel. Concern about possible collusion is realistic. But to
require an accused, unlearned in the vagaries of the law and unaware
of counsel's omissions, to voice his objections during the trial can very
188 Ibid.
137 A noteworthy approach is that of the court in Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30
(9th Cir. 1962).138 Johns v. Smyth, 176 F.Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
130 Hendrickson v. Overlade, 131 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ind. 1955). But see Sanchez
v. State, 199 Ind. 235, 157 N.E. 1 (1927).
140 Sayre v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 338, 238 S.W. 737 (1922).
14' Edwards v. United States, 265 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1959).
142 Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941) ; Sayre v. Commonwealth,
supra note 140.
143 People v. Mitchell, 411 Ill. 407, 104 N.E.2d 285 (1952).
'" Perhaps though counsel of the sort Judge Lumbard refers to as "class two"
counsel would not be deserving of such recognition, see Lumbard, The Adequacy of
Lawyer Now in Criminal Practice, 47 J. Am. JuD. Soc'v 176 (1964).
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well operate to deprive him of a fair trial. Even if accused does object
during the trial, the trial judge may refuse to listen."' So, while the
conflict of policy interests between the accused's necessity for a fair
trial and hampering the effective administration of justice presents a
difficulty, a realistic court, rather than making a cursory dismissal on
doctrine, would closely scrutinize the facts to ascertain whether the
post trial objection is valid and whether collusion in fact exists."'
LImITATIONS OF REVIEW
The limitation on the scope of review presents the most serious
problem to the accused in his effort to call to the court's attention the
questions of ineffectiveness, particularly those that lie outside the
record. On direct attack, appellate courts adhere strictly to the
record.' Since there is a presumption of regularity'. from the face
of the record the burden on the defendant is doubly difficult.
Collateral attack leaves room for some hope, but the situation still
is uncertain. In the early case of Frank v. Mangum... the Supreme
Court showed a willingness to go beyond the record in a habeas corpus
case. However, that case was distinguished into nonexistence. 5 As a
result, the federal courts have refused in habeas corpus actions to go
beyond the record to consider the adequacy of representation.'' How-
ever, the Supreme Court has drawn a valuable distinction which has
recently been followed.' 52 In Palmer v. Ashe" 3 it was pointed out that
although the record may be relevantly considered in a habeas corpus
proceeding it is relevant only in so far as it refutes the accused's con-
tentions; but where the record is mute, constitutional rights would not
be sacrificed merely because their denial is not set forth. Thus, par-
ticularly in instances of omissions due to inadequate pre-trial prepara-
tion, the court will go beyond the record in habeas corpus proceedings.
If the state hearing was less than a "full and fair evidentiary hearing"
on the rehearing, then the federal district court may have to re-
145 United States ex rel. Foley v. Ragan, 52 F.Supp. 265, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1943).
146 See note 137 supra.
1
47 Hagen v. United States, 9 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1925) and People v. Graff,
104 Cal. App. 2d 32, 34, 230 P.2d 654, 656 (1951). But cf. State v. Lei, 59 Wn.2d 1,
365 P.2d 609 (1961) where the court went outside the record to consider affidavits of
counsel justifying his conduct of the defense.
148 Beckett v. Hudspeth, 131 F.2d 195 (10th Cir. 1942).
149 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915).
150 Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335 (1923).
151 Thomas v. Hunter, 153 F.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir. 1946).
1352 Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 137 (1951) establishes the distinction discussed
in the text, and Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962) follows it.
15 342 U.S. 134, 137 (1951).
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determine the questions1 5 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 55 has
applied this type of reasoning to ineffective representation, by recog-
nizing that while direct appeals should be limited to the record,"' it is
not proper to do so for a collateral attack. This would seem to be the
sound approach, since it is a rare trial when ineffectiveness, particularly
incompetency, is so clear as to appear on the record. This is even more
clearly the case with counsel's omissions. At most the record will show
some tactical blunders, and if incompetency was so overt as to show
on the record, in most instances the trial would be stopped by the trial
judge in his effort to further justice. But failure to call all the necessary
witnesses or to do sufficient research, lack of knowledge of how to go
about completely protecting a client, or even mental or emotional
problems and conflicts of interest between attorney and client are not
matters which generally are seen by the court, or which fall within
the trial record. Thus, perhaps even on direct attack the court should
not confine itself to a "record worship," but should examine the
allegations, and if they appear valid remand for a hearing to demon-
strate their validity. If ineffectiveness is then established, the accused
must be given a new trial. To raise the question of ineffective repre-
sentation more than a mere general criticism of the counsels conduct
of the case is necessary. 57 What must be done is to make a specific
allegation of ineffectiveness, spelling out in detail in what respects
counsel has failed to perform.158 If this is done, the appellate court
will find it easier to remand for a hearing.
PoLIcY FACTORS MILITATING AGAINST R.EVERSAL
An -examination of the factors considered relevant on the question
of effective representation is incomplete unless the underlying policy
questions that affect the decisions are also scrutinized. Thus, since
members of a lawyer-trained court will have a deep understanding for
the problems of presenting a defense and conducting a trial, it is evident
that they will be understandably reluctant to aid a convicted accused
in attempts to try their counsel. For the appellate court to sustain the
accused's contention that his counsel did not effectively represent him
amounts to a condemnation of the lawyer's professional status without
154 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
'us Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
5 6 Id. at 32, n. 4.
'17 Sweet v. Howard, 155 F2d 715 (7th Cir. 1946).
'
5 s Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
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a hearing. 5 ' The radial effects of such condemnation may be a dis-
barment proceeding.. and/or a malpractice suit on the basis of the
appellate court's finding in accused's case. It is not easy for judges
who experienced similar difficulties and appreciate the problems in-
volved to subject counsel to such penalties. Further radial effects
could be to discourage the younger members of the bar from readily
accepting defense appointments 6' for fear of being subjected to the
above recourse. Another policy factor operating against a finding of
ineffective representation is the possible interference with the adminis-
tration of justice. 2 This is manifested in the form of a judicial fear
that a liberal interpretation of effectiveness would "give every convict
the privilege of opening a Pandora's box of accusations which trial
courts near large penal institutions would be compelled to hear.' 6 3
One other court has expressed a view that such a remedy could have
an adverse effect on prison discipline.'"'
This is an area of the law which is difficult and delicate to handle.
No member of the bench wishes to brand a member of the bar as a
poor representative of the profession. This and the other policy con-
siderations tend to make the courts cautious. Perhaps this reticence
is justified, since in the final analysis, many allegations of ineffective
representation may be unsupported and merely the product of an
unhappy convict's desire for retribution.
But accepting all of these considerations, the view espoused by most
courts still is too rigid. The approach that follows a doctrine-bound
rule is not desirable even though it may impose a lighter burden. When
we consider that it is recognized by both practitioners and laymen 65
that an accused otherwise certain to be convicted has on more than
one occasion been acquitted because of the advocacy of an able criminal
lawyer, we become aware of the importance of counsel's role in the
defense. Thus, it would have to be concluded that the most desirable
approach in terms of securing adequate representation is that followed
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in utilizing and requiring a
close judicial scrutiny of all the facts of the individual situation when
159 State v. Dreher, 137 Mo. 11, 38 S.W. 567 (1897).
160 See United States ex rel. Hall v. Gagan, 60 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. IIl. 1945).
161 Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
162 State v. Dreher, 137 Mo. 11, 38 S.W. 567 (1897).
163 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
164 Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949).
165 NOBLE & AvERBUCH, NEVER PLEAD GUILTY (1955) ; STONE, CLARENCE DARu~ow
FoR THE DEFENSE (1941).
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those facts have been appropriately and specifically put before the
court.
STANDARDS
The level of performance is discussed last, because only after all the
factors and policy considerations are examined, can a full appreciation
of the standards or the judicial omission thereof, be had. At this point
it should be obvious that the performance required of counsel must
vary with the stage of the proceedings being examined. Omissions in
pretrial preparation, having a substantial effect upon the final result,
cannot be measured by the same standard as failure to object to leading
questions or failure to make an appropriate motion during the trial.
However, as the above review would indicate, the courts have been
following just such a course. Even though the concept of effective
representation applies to the entire proceedings, its content varies with
each particular stage and thus it also presents the hazard of misappli-
cation unless the courts are cognizant that each individual situation
must be scrutinized independently and not handled by attempting to
force outmoded doctrines to fit the situation.
The ultimate objective in each situation is the due-process-fair trial.
But in achieving this objective courts espouse such standards as "mock-
ery of justice" and a trial reduced to a "sham and a farce." Such
standards may be appropriately applicable in the instance of conduct
during the trial, since they address themselves to affirmative conduct,
and would set a high standard for judging the exercise of judgment,
but they are totally unsatisfactory in application to faulty pre-trial
preparation. The major difficulty is one of emphasis. The latter two
tests focus upon affirmative conduct, and thus when stare decisis is
called upon and past doctrine is unveiled to solve a problem of omitted
defenses, these standards lead to a totally unjust result.
In conclusion, we can say that in certain stages of the proceedings,
such as exercise of judgment during the trial, a standard of perform-
ance is impossible to establish. Nonetheless, a court's function should
be to concentrate its attention on the stage in question and scrutinize
the alleged malfunction in that context, viewing it against the desired
objective of a fair trial. KENNETH 0. JARVI
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